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1.  Introduction 
Discretionary monetary and fiscal policy decisions from the Federal Government have 
prevented the Australian economy from generating enough jobs to match the preferences 
of the labour force, and enough hours of work to match the preferences of those who are 
employed. The result has been persistently high unemployment and rising levels of 
underemployment (Mitchell and Carlson, 2001). 
Figure 1 shows the dramatic rise in importance of part-time work in Australia since 1978. 
A rising proportion of part-time work is now casual (Pocock et al, 2004). It is often 
argued that employers have simply responded to demographic and social changes and 
provided part-time and casual positions to match the preferences of the workers for more 
flexible working lives. However, it is now clear that the dramatic increase in part-time 
(casual) work since the late 1970s (and particularly since the end of the 1991 recession) 
has not been in line with the preferences of the workforce. 
Figure 1 Part-time to total employment, Australia, 1978-2005, per cent 
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Part-time to total employment (%)
P
er
ce
nt
 o
f t
ot
al
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
 
Source: ABS Labour Force Survey, AUSSTATS Data Cube 6291.0.55.001. 
Underemployment has now become an entrenched problem after rising sharply after the 
1991 recession (Mitchell, 2001; Wilkins, 2005). Wilkins (2005) notes that more than one 
in three part-time workers in Australia are underemployed and would like to work more 
hours (half of the part-time men and one-third of part-time women are underemployed).  
In Section 2 we argue that the problem goes beyond the lack of work hours available. The 
characteristics of the increasing number of part-time ‘non-standard’ jobs – precarious 
tenure, low pay, non-standard working hours - mean that not only the quantity of hours 
has been insufficient but, increasingly, has the quality of the work experience deteriorated 
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(Borland, Gregory and Sheehan, 2001). Moreover, there is ample evidence to suggest that 
the Australian labour market has developed a stronger dual structure over time (Debelle 
and Swan, 1998; Song and Webster, 2003) 
Given the emphasis on enhancing search in current labour market policy as a remedy for 
poor employment prospects, an interesting question arises. If there are increasing 
numbers of workers who are underemployed and facing declining job quality, then has 
this impacted on their search behaviour? Further, has it reduced the returns on search 
behaviour?  
Dual labour market (DLM) theory argues that the labour market is segmented into two 
separate labour markets each with different processes for allocation and reward. The most 
basic demarcation is between the Primary Labour Market (PLM) and the Secondary 
Labour Market (SLM). The two markets are separated by rigidities which inhibit mobility 
across them. Accordingly, if a worker becomes ‘trapped’ into the SLM, access to the 
better outcomes in the PLM becomes severely limited if not intractable. Search behaviour 
in this model then depends on which market a worker operates within. 
There is empirical evidence saying that the unemployed spend very little time actually 
searching for work (Burdett, 1978). Further, the majority of workers search ‘on-the-job’ – 
that is, they do not engage in spells of unemployment to search for their next employment 
opportunity. This raises questions about whether search behaviour differs according to 
the type of job one has, which in turn, has relevance for dual labour market theory. 
Consistent with DLM theory, we thus hypothesise that on-the-job search behaviour is 
likely to be different according to which ‘segment’ the worker is employed within. The 
PLM worker who is typically employed in a tight internal labour market structure which 
provides for career advancement will use search activity to enhance his/her career 
aspirations. Conversely, the SLM worker may search for different reasons especially 
given the precariousness of their employment. Search thus may not be motivated by 
potential employment improvement, but might, rather, be fuelled by fear of future job 
loss. 
This paper draws on data from the first three waves of the Household Income and Labour 
Dynamics Australia (HILDA) data set. The HILDA survey is funded by the Australian 
government and followed up on an annual basis since its introduction in 2001. The 
survey consists of three parts: a household questionnaire, a personal questionnaire and a 
self-completion questionnaire. We use the personal questionnaire which details the labour 
market status of respondents - job satisfaction; expectations about future labour market 
status; job search behaviour, and – since we use several waves – transition rates to 
different labour market positions. We test several hypotheses in relation to job search 
motivation, career advancement and search outcomes. 
The paper is organised as follows. The changing nature of the Australian labour market 
and its growing dualisation over time is presented in Section 2, which also outlines the 
HILDA data to be used. Section 3 discusses some key aspects of DLM theory and Human 
Capital theory (HCT) particularly with regard to job search behaviour. Section 4 
describes the econometric methods and discusses the estimation results in relation to our 
hypotheses. Concluding remarks follow. 
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2.  The changing nature of the Australian labour market 
Underemployment has now become an entrenched problem in Australia after rising 
sharply after the 1991 recession. Wilkins (2005) estimated that total underemployed 
(600,000) has now overtaken the official unemployment count (around 530,000). The rise 
in underemployment occurred during the 1991 recession as employers shed full-time jobs 
and replaced them with part-time (casual) jobs. While there has also been a trend increase 
in the relative importance of part-time work, it remains that a substantial portion of part-
time employment work represents a response to the deficiency of demand over this 
period. 
The problem goes beyond the lack of work hours available. The characteristics of an 
increasing number of part-time ‘non-standard’ jobs – precarious tenure, low pay, non-
standard working hours - mean that not only the quantity of hours has been insufficient 
but, increasingly, so has the quality of the work experience deteriorated (Borland, 
Gregory and Sheehan, 2001). OECD (2002) data shows that the trend towards 
increasingly insecure employment in Australia is in contradistinction to the general 
OECD trend. Pocock et al (2004) provide an updated analysis of the different states of 
employment security across OECD economies. 
Table 1 documents this dramatic change in the Australian labour market over the last 25 
years. In the 12 months to October 2005, 55 per cent of all new jobs have been part-time 
(around 30 per cent in the early 1980s). What is not often understood is the sheer decline 
in full-time job opportunities during the 1990s. Between December 1979 and December 
1989, 1,009.8 thousand full-time jobs and 668.6 thousand part-time jobs were created 
(the latter being 40 per cent of total employment change). In the following decade 
(December 1989-December 1999) the net change in full-time employment amounted to 
388.4 thousand with 668.9 thousand part-time jobs created net (the latter being 63 per 
cent of net total employment change). In the five year period from October 2000 to 
October 2005, full-time employment in net terms rose by 426.1 thousand and part-time 
535.1 thousand (56 per cent of the net total employment change). In other words, while 
there has been some recovery in full-time career oriented employment, the underlying 
trend towards increasingly fractionalised employment has continued and has eroded 
career opportunities for increasing numbers of Australian workers. 
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Table 1 Full-time, part-time and total employment changes, Australia, 1980-2005 
Period ∆Full-time 
Employment 
(000s) 
∆ Part-time 
Employment 
(000s) 
∆ Total 
Employment 
(000s) 
% Part-time in New 
Jobs 
(per cent) 
1980 217.5 83.7 301.2 28 
1985 188.1 86.6 274.8 32 
1990 -59.4 39.4 -20.0 -197 
1995 200.5 79.0 279.6 28 
2000 88.0 86.4 174.5 50 
2001 -62.0 142.8 80.8 177 
2002 147.1 134.7 281.7 48 
2003 123.2 29.8 153.1 19 
2004 171.0 93.3 264.3 35 
2005 104.4 128.7 233.1 55 
Source: ABS Labour Force Survey, AUSSTATS Data Cube 6291.0.55.001. ∆ refers to the absolute change 
from December the previous year to December in the year shown in thousands. For 2005 the changes are 
from October 2004 to October 2005. 
The ABS also publishes data on employees without paid entitlements which allow us to 
gauge the extent to which casualisation (represented by an absence of annual leave 
entitlements) has permeated the Australian labour market. Table 2 compares November 
2001 and 2005 (the last two publications available). The stagnant nature of full-time 
employment growth is indicated by the comparison. However, there has been a decline in 
the percentage of workers without paid leave entitlements largely driven by a spurt in 
part-time work in the four year period that carried such entitlements. Overall, 21 per cent 
of people in the labour force are without paid leave entitlements. 
The HILDA data also provides evidence to support our claims (see also Borrooah and 
Mangan, 2004). We use the first three waves of the HILDA survey and select respondents 
that replied to all three waves, which reduces the sample set to 10,777. From that sample, 
we selected respondents who are part of the labour force and the unemployed who are not 
seeking for a job because they believe no work is available. This reduces the sample set 
to 7,064 respondents in 2001 (7,135 and 7,051 in 2002 and 2003, respectively). 
Appendix Table I summarises the data we use in our analysis. The Table contains sector 
and occupational job level statistics for unemployed, which refers to their last job. Since 
the unemployed may use more channels at one time, the search channels do not add to 
100 per cent. Finally, transition variables have no statistics for 2003 because a fourth 
wave (2004) is needed to calculate them. The data shows that 31 per cent of employees 
work part-time (27 per cent involuntary and 4 per cent voluntary). Further, over 30 
percent of all employees work on a casual or fixed term contract. Finally, workers appear 
to lack confidence in their ability to find another job when sacked (about 63 on a scale 0-
100). 
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Table 2 Employees leave entitlements, November 2001 and 2005, 000s 
 November 2001 November 2005 
 
Full 
time 
Part 
time 
Total Full 
time 
Part 
time 
Total 
Males       
Without paid leave entitlements 435.7 435.2 870.9 305.7 556.5 862.2 
All males 3276.8 542.6 3819.4 3695.4 1629.9 5325.3
% without paid leave entitlements 13.3% 80.2% 22.8% 8.3% 34.1% 16.2% 
Females       
Without paid leave entitlements 229.8 939.8 1169.6 170.9 955.8 1126.7
All females 1960.9 1520.9 3481.8 1858.1 2457.6 4315.7
% without paid leave entitlements 11.7% 61.8% 33.6% 9.2% 38.9% 26.1% 
Persons       
Without paid leave entitlements 665.6 1375.0 2040.6 476.6 1512.3 1988.9
All persons 5237.8 2053.6 7291.4 5553.5 4087.5 9641.0
% without paid leave entitlements 12.7% 67.0% 28.0% 8.6% 37.0% 20.6% 
Source: ABS 6359.0. Without leave entitlements includes all employees without any paid work 
entitlements who may be employed as casual or on fixed term contracts. The totals for each group include 
owners/managers. 
Consistent with the existence of a SLM, a high proportion of the unemployed are also 
lowly educated – over 50 per cent of unemployed persons has at most a secondary school 
completion compared to 33 per cent of all employees. About 50 per cent of unemployed 
had previously been labourers or elementary workers, as opposed to less than 10 per cent 
of the employees. Long-term unemployment is almost 55 per cent of total unemployment 
in 2003. 
3. Dual labour market theory versus human capital theory 
Human capital (HCT) theory became a central pillar of neo-classical microeconomics in 
the 1960s. It was in sharp contradistinction to the notions developed by DLM theory. 
Accordingly, HCT considers wage differentials to be a function of investment decisions 
made by individuals about their own capacity development. The outcomes of education 
and training are thus ‘carried by’ the individual into the labour market and are manifest in 
the form of high productivity. HCT thus embeds into marginal productivity theory to 
provide an explanation of the differences in earnings. Moreover, job search behaviour is 
constructed within the concept of the individual as a rational, maximising agent. 
Unemployment is considered a productive activity (Phelps, 1970). While on the surface 
the unemployed worker is in that state because they are unable to find work (invoking 
notions of demand deficiency), in fact, according to early search theory, he/she is 
engaging in search. The search for work involves the worker continually testing the 
market for his/her ‘real value’ which generates a feedback loop whereby the market 
information and the workers perception of his/her ‘real value’ (embodied in the 
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reservation wage) interact to condition the decision making. Search involves time. 
Human capital theory suggests that job search is triggered by the prospect of finding a job 
or – in case of on-the-job search – finding a better one. Therefore, it predicts that job 
search will improve the allocation of workers over jobs and moreover, that job search 
will hand unemployed and low wage employees the opportunity to escape the bottom 
side of the labour market. 
HCT also provides support for the neoclassical notion of compensating differentials 
whereby variations in the non-pecuniary characteristics of employment provide market 
signals which compel the employer to offer extra pay to compensate workers for the bad 
job characteristics. Precarious employment, other things equal should be rewarded more 
fully than secure employment. 
However, DLM theory challenges this conception of individual labour market dynamics. 
If SLM jobs carry low wages, and truncated or non-existent career ladders then an 
individual’s life cycle outcomes may not resemble those predicted by HCT. Further, 
DLM theory considers job quality characteristics (good or bad) to be clustered within 
labour market segments. Accordingly, PLM jobs offer high quality employment 
uniformly with high pay while the SLM tends to offer jobs that are of low quality and 
low pay. 
The neoclassical notion of compensating differentials is not consistent with cumulative 
clusters of bad and good job characteristics. A risk-averse worker who places higher store 
on negative income changes than positive will typically prefer secure/good employment 
and hence has to be paid higher lifetime earnings to take an unstable/bad job (Abowd and 
Ashenfelter, 1988). Conversely, dual labour market theory considers good and bad job 
characteristics to be cumulative and segmented. Dickens and Lang (1988: 132) say that 
“if firms pay high wages to reduce shirking . . . they will find it advantageous to provide 
stable employment … [and] … secondary firms that do not pay high wages may well 
have a comparative advantage in serving unstable demand.” Workers on the secondary 
labour market are more likely to cycle through regular spells of unemployment and 
insecure work.  
Tests of these predictions, perhaps not surprisingly, have encountered numerous 
difficulties. Ehrenberg and Smith (1991) suggest that an empirical verification of the 
compensating differentials hypothesis is inherently hampered by the ceteris paribus 
assumption, i.e. the need to control for the effects of age, education, gender, region, race, 
union status, etc. This need, together with the problem of specifying a priori disagreeable 
job characteristics, has made supportive empirical evidence for the underlying hypothesis 
scarce or disputed.  
Drago and Wi (1995) used cluster analysis in an Australia study using job characteristics 
as the way of defining the demarcation between the segments. He concluded that 
segments do exist and three key factors – the internal promotions ladder, on-the-job 
training and unexplained wage differentials are found to be consistent with those 
predicted by Gordon et al (1982). 
Flatau and Lewis (1993) employ cluster analysis on an occupational basis to determine 
three separable groups (secondary, intermediate and primary). Their approach also is a 
multi-dimensional analysis of job characteristics. They considered a range of 
characteristics such as wages, employment conditions, training ladders, job security to be 
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important and able to be discriminated into groupings which would be consistent with 
dual labour market theory. 
It is clear that the key dual labour market theory proposition of definable and entrenched 
differences in pay systems across defined labour market groupings requires rigidities 
between the ‘segments’ to be strong and persistent. However, empirical efforts to identify 
distinct segments have not been entirely successful. Another way of thinking about this is 
to investigate the way in which jobs are rationed in the economy and whether we can 
detect definable ‘individual’ worker characteristics interacting with ‘job’ characteristics 
in any systematic way. DLM theory requires that disadvantaged workers are restricted in 
their realistic aspirations and hence outcomes by their relative confinement to the SLM. 
If there are distinct features of primary and secondary jobs along the lines specified by 
DLM then this would have implications for job search motivation. Primary workers 
typically will seek career advancement and gather information accordingly. However, 
these workers will also typically be in a tight internal labour market structure which 
provides for career advancement in a more or less orderly manner. Whereas employed 
job search (and unemployed job search) at the bottom end of the labour market is 
unlikely to be triggered by the prospect of a better job (a new job), but rather by the fear 
of losing one’s current job (fear of sanctions if remaining unemployed). The latter type of 
job search is extrinsically motivated; the former intrinsically. We use this difference in 
job search motivation in our empirical analysis to add a new element to the empirical 
DLM theory literature.  
Our hypotheses are as follows: 
First, intrinsic motives not only lead to more job search, but also to an improved labour 
market position in terms of the quality of the new job as compared to the previous job. 
Second, extrinsic motives also lead to more job search, but not to an improved labour 
market position in terms of the quality of the new job as compared to the previous job. 
Third, building on hypothesis one, employed job seekers in the SLM and unemployed job 
seekers compete for the same jobs, where the latter are less successful competitors. There 
is evidence to support the notion that more skilled workers ‘bump’ less skilled workers 
out of their normal job markets when there is demand deficiency (Buck and Gordon, 
1987). If both of these groups of job seekers indeed search in the same labour market 
segment, they face similar labour demand conditions. Putting pressure on unemployed to 
accept a job, does – in those circumstances – not raise employment, but only leads to a 
reshuffling of the unemployment pool. 
4. Econometric model and results 
4.1 Intrinsically versus extrinsically motivated job search 
Our first aim is to verify whether intrinsic and extrinsic motives to search for a job indeed 
lead to job search, as hypotheses 1 and 2 predict. Table 3 contains the logit regression 
results for job search decisions of employees and – if searching - their success in finding 
a new job.2 
Controlling for tenure effects, older employed workers are significantly less likely to 
search for another job than the first age cohort. Moreover, employed men are 
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significantly more likely to search for a job than women, though they are not more 
successful in finding a job. Tenure reduces job search as a person builds up firm-specific 
skills which make the worker more productive in her current position than outside. 
Table 3 Determinants of job search and its success (employed and unemployed), 2001-
2003 
Dependent variables 
Independent variables Employed 
job search 
Employed 
success 
UN job 
search 
UN 
success 
Constant 1.75** (0.22) 
0.86 
(0.45) 
89.25*** 
(1.35) 
0.37 
 (0.73) 
Personal characteristics:     
Age cohort:      
16−30 years reference reference reference reference 
31−40 years 1.03 (0.07) 
0.97 
(0.14) 
0.56 
(0.99) 
0.75 
(0.40) 
41−50 years 1.02 (0.07) 
0.74** 
(0.15) 
0.26 
(0.94) 
1.60 
(0.40) 
51−65 years 0.71*** (0.10) 
1.01 
(0.22) 
0.07*** 
(0.92) 
0.52 
(0.47) 
Female reference reference reference reference 
Male 1.24*** (0.06) 
1.19 
(0.12) 
2.47 
(0.55) 
1.39 
(0.34) 
Living outside major SR reference reference reference reference 
Sydney 0.88* (0.08) 
0.83 
(0.16) 
0.91 
(0.70) 
1.39 
(0.40) 
Melbourne 1.01 (0.07) 
0.87 
(0.15) 
1.57 
(0.80) 
1.71 
(0.42) 
Brisbane 1.18* (0.09) 
0.87 
(0.19) 
0.34 
(0.80) 
0.71 
(0.53) 
Adelaide 0.98 (0.11) 
1.08 
(0.22) 
0.20* 
(0.88) 
0.69 
(0.55) 
Perth 1.11 (0.10) 
0.96 
(0.22) 
0.23 
(0.95) 
1.76 
(0.71) 
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Intrinsic search motivation:     
Involuntary part-time reference reference   
Full time 0.33*** (0.12) 
0.90 
(0.22) 
  
Voluntary part-time 0.26*** (0.12) 
0.84 
(0.22) 
  
Confidence to find another job 1.005*** (0.00) 
1.002 
(0.00) 
1.02* 
(0.01) 
1.01** 
(0.00) 
Probability lo leave job voluntarily 1.02*** (0.00) 
1.01*** 
(0.00) 
  
Satisfaction about hours worked 0.92*** (0.01) 
1.01 
(0.03) 
  
Satisfaction about pay 0.93*** (0.01) 
1.02 
(0.02) 
  
Satisfaction about job securitya 0.91*** (0.01) 
0.95** 
(0.03) 
  
Short-term unemployed    reference reference 
Long-term unemployed   0.30** (0.61) 
0.38*** 
(0.32) 
Extrinsic search motivation:     
Fixed term contract reference reference   
Casual contract 0.96 (0.10) 
0.83 
(0.21) 
  
Permanent contract 0.88 (0.09) 
0.89 
(0.19) 
  
Fear to lose the current job 1.003*** (0.00) 
1.003 
(0.00) 
  
No search requirement (Centre Link)     reference 
Search requirement (Centre Link)    0.34*** (0.33) 
(Previous) Job characteristics:     
Tenure 0.96*** (0.01) 
0.95*** 
(0.01) 
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Reason for job loss:     
Ran out of contract   reference reference 
Employer initiated break-up   0.79 (0.82) 
0.65 
(0.39) 
Employee initiated break-up   0.81 (1.07) 
1.27 
(0.47) 
Self employed   1.40 (1.47) 
0.11 
(1.49) 
Health or personal reasons   0.28 (0.78) 
0.57 
(0.44) 
Search channels applied:     
Centre link   
  reference 
Advertisements    1.23 (0.34) 
Employment agency (private)    1.89** (0.31) 
Informal search    0.93 (0.38) 
Educational level:     
(Pre-)primary/secondary school reference reference reference reference 
Certificate 1.13* (0.07) 
0.76* 
(0.15) 
0.88 
(0.60) 
0.70 
(0.33) 
Advanced diploma and diploma 0.37*** (0.11) 
0.86 
(0.22) 
0.13** 
(0.84) 
0.47 
(0.69) 
 (Post) Graduate, Bachelor degree 1.50*** (0.08) 
0.99 
(0.17) 
0.35 
(0.79) 
1.50 
(0.49) 
Rest 1.25 (0.26) 
0.41 
(0.62) 
0.15 
(1.11) 
0.89 
(0.92) 
Industry level (last job):     
Private sector reference reference reference reference 
Public sector 1.15** (0.07) 
0.71** 
(0.14) 
2.99 
(0.71) 
1.29 
(0.40) 
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Occupational level (last job):     
Labourers reference reference reference reference 
Elementary workers 1.04 (0.12) 
0.67 
(0.25) 
1.54 
(1.02) 
1.72 
(0.51) 
Intermediate production workers 1.11 (0.13) 
0.51** 
(0.27) 
1.58 
(0.81) 
2.15 
(0.49) 
Intermediate clerical workers 1.24* (0.11) 
0.85 
(0.23) 
7.22** 
(0.93) 
1.51 
(0.52) 
Advanced clericals 1.55** (0.18) 
1.01 
(0.37) 
0.81 
(1.36) 
16.76** 
(1.29) 
Tradespersons 1.01 (0.13) 
0.67 
(0.26) 
0.41 
(0.85) 
3.94*** 
(0.52) 
Associate professionals 1.29** (0.12) 
0.70 
(0.26) 
1.11 
(0.85) 
4.87** 
(0.64) 
Managers, professionals 1.28** (0.12) 
0.63* 
(0.24) 
2.03 
(0.91) 
2.76* 
(0.60) 
Year:     
2001 reference reference reference reference 
2002 1.004 (0.06) 
1.13 
(0.11) 
0.31 
(1.29) 
1.70 
(0.62) 
2003 1.02 (0.06) 
 0.48 
(1.34) 
 
     
No of observations 15,284 1,609 407 300 
No where dependent variable is 1 2,404 675 377 149 
* 10% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Consequently the worker is less likely to search for a new job and once searching less 
likely to accept a job given her higher reservation wage. There is also a positive link 
between employed job search and the educational level, though a higher educational level 
does not affect the chance to find a new job once employed. The recent cuts in public 
sector employment have induced those who are still employed in the sector to search for 
employment elsewhere. The fact that they have to search outside their own sector for new 
employment, might explain the low success rate of public sector workers. 
Table 3 summarises the estimation results of the impact of intrinsic and extrinsic job 
search motivation on actual job search. The data reports voluntary and involuntary (wants 
to work more hours but cannot find a suitable job) part-time employment. By controlling 
for type of contract, we identify differences in job search behaviour between the 
voluntary and involuntary part-time employees arising from intrinsic motivation. Table 3 
shows that involuntarily part-time employment leads to more job search, though it does 
not raise the chance of finding a new job. Under hours worked, we present two direct 
measures of intrinsic search: (a) confidence to find another job at least as good as the 
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current; and (b) the probability to leave the current job voluntarily. Both variables are 
linked positively to job search. The latter also leads to a more successful search process. 
Next we include three job satisfaction measures. The less satisfied an employee is about 
her current job, in terms of pay, hours worked, and job security, the more we expect her 
to search for a better job.3 Since these workers experience no immediate risk of job loss 
which forces them to search, this type of search is intrinsic. 
We observe that less work satisfaction on all three aspects indeed leads to more job 
search, though only to more success for those looking for more job security. 
Consequently, we find support for the first part of hypothesis 1: intrinsic motives lead to 
more job search. 
We explore different proxies for extrinsic job search. Initially we use type of contract and 
expect that an employee holding a casual or fixed-term contract to be motivated 
extrinsically to search for a job. However, the results fail to show that such employees 
search significantly more than employees with a permanent contract or – if searching – 
have a better chance of finding a job. Next we use a perception variable (fear of loss of 
current job within the next year).  The results show that it triggers job search but does not 
increase the success rate. Thus, we also find support for the first part of hypothesis 2: 
extrinsic motives lead to more job search. 
The last two columns in Table 3 explore the effects of intrinsic and extrinsic search on 
unemployed job search and subsequent successful job search. We include two proxies for 
intrinsic job search: (a) the unemployed person’s confidence in finding a job; and (b) the 
duration of the uncompleted spell of unemployment. We expect the long-term 
unemployed to be too demoralised to continue to search after receiving several rejections 
after job interviews. Both variables provide support for a positive influence of intrinsic 
motivation on both job search and successful job search. 
To measure extrinsic motivation, we use the information pertaining to whether the 
unemployed has been handed a deadline by Centrelink to find a job. That is, Centrelink 
might require the person to ‘work for the dole’ if they fail to find a job within a given 
period. The results show that the unemployed, who are extrinsically motivated to search, 
are significantly less successful than others. Given the range of control variables – 
including unemployment duration – this suggests that pressuring the unemployed to 
search when there are demand constraints is not an effective way to lead the unemployed 
back into employment, which is in line with hypothesis 3.4 It should be noted that our 
analysis is only studying the supply side of the matching process. Firms might use the 
information that unemployed have been motivated extrinsically to stigmatise them, which 
also explains their lower chance to find a job. 
4.2 Determinants of job improvement following job change 
Though the unemployed might be satisfied with finding any job, employed job seekers 
would prefer to shift to a better job. We therefore focus on the quality of the new job of 
the employed job searcher relative to the quality of the job she leaves. As in the previous 
section we explore how intrinsic and extrinsic search affect the quality outcome arising 
from a job change, in an attempt to clarify the second part of hypotheses 1 and 2. 
To measure the quality improvement of a job change we use the HILDA variables: pay, 
job security and hours worked satisfaction (each measured on a 0-10 scale). We focus on 
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employees that changed jobs between waves, which provides an indication of the 
increase in job satisfaction as a result of the job change. Table 4 provides the logit results. 
In the first three regressions we analyse the separate effects of the quality factors that 
might indicate a quality improvement following a job change. The fourth regression 
combines the three factors. 
The pay improvement regression shows that the probability of gaining a pay increase 
following a job change decreases with age, but increases with tenure. The latter effect 
might occur because our definition of job change includes occupational change within the 
same firm. This allows for job changes within the PLM. In terms of intrinsic job search 
the results suggest that those who were unsatisfied about their pay in their previous job 
make amends in their next job. There is no evidence that high satisfaction in terms of the 
two other satisfaction measures is a necessary condition to achieve pay improvement. 
Consequently, having an otherwise high quality job is no prerequisite to achieve pay 
improvement. Confidence in finding another job adds to finding a better paying job, 
whereas a high probability of leaving the current job does not. Turning to extrinsic 
motivation we observe that all variables have negative signs. Fear of losing the previous 
job is the only significant variable, indicating that extrinsically motivated search lowers 
the probability to enjoy a wage increase following a job change. 
The hours worked regression shows that women are more likely to improve the number 
of hours worked following a job change than men, which may reflect the fact that women 
more often start from a part-time job. As in the pay improvement case, employees who 
are not satisfied about their working hours and hence search intrinsically to improve this 
item in a future job, succeed in doing so. Other intrinsic and extrinsic variables do not 
affect the chances of finding a new job characterised by more satisfaction with ‘hours 
worked’. 
The job quality regression shows that employees looking for more job security find it, 
regardless of other qualities of the job. However, extrinsic search motives reduce the 
chance to find a more secure job. That is, fear of losing the previous job or motivation 
driven by coercion (no renewal of an expiring contract, sacking or close of business) to 
leave the job, leading to extrinsic search, reduce the probability to find a more secure job. 
Table 4 Job change and quality improvement, 2001-2002 
 Dependent variables: Improvement in 
Independent variables Pay Hours wkd Job security Overall 
Threshold one 22.66*** (0.47) 
71.29*** 
(0.49) 
131.34*** 
(0.51) 
0.00*** 
(0.43) 
Threshold two    0.00*** (0.42) 
Threshold three    0.00*** (0.40) 
Threshold four    0.01*** (0.39) 
Threshold five    0.08*** (0.38) 
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Personal characteristics:     
Age cohort:      
16−30 years reference reference reference reference 
31−40 years 0.80* (0.13) 
0.94 
(0.14) 
0.95 
(0.14) 
0.79** 
(0.10) 
41−50 years 0.78 (0.15) 
1.01 
(0.16) 
0.83 
(0.16) 
0.74*** 
(0.12) 
51−65 years 0.83 (0.20) 
1.29 
(0.20) 
0.67* 
(0.22) 
0.80 
(0.15) 
Female reference reference reference reference 
Male 1.18 (0.12) 
0.81* 
(0.12) 
0.84 
(0.12) 
0.93 
(0.09) 
Living outside major SR reference reference reference reference 
Sydney 0.91 (0.15) 
1.11 
(0.16) 
0.87 
(0.16) 
0.95 
(0.12) 
Melbourne 1.06 (0.15) 
1.06 
(0.15) 
0.91 
(0.16) 
0.96 
(0.12) 
Brisbane 0.69** (0.19) 
0.86 
(0.19) 
1.08 
(0.19) 
0.96 
(0.14) 
Adelaide 1.06 (0.21) 
1.11 
(0.21) 
1.23 
(0.22) 
0.91 
(0.17) 
Perth 1.01 (0.20) 
0.84 
(0.21) 
1.10 
(0.21) 
0.95 
(0.16) 
Intrinsic search motivation:     
Involuntary part-time reference reference reference reference 
Full time 0.86 (0.27) 
0.72 
(0.27) 
1.41 
(0.29) 
0.59** 
(0.22) 
Voluntary part-time 1.19 (0.27) 
0.72 
(0.28) 
1.20 
(0.29) 
0.65* 
(0.22) 
Pay satisfaction (previous job) 0.55*** (0.03) 
1.04 
(0.03) 
0.98 
(0.03) 
0.76*** 
(0.02) 
Hours satisfaction (previous job) 1.02 (0.02) 
0.51*** 
(0.03) 
1.003 
(0.03) 
0.76*** 
(0.02) 
Job security satisfaction (previous 
job) 
0.98 
(0.03) 
1.02 
(0.03) 
0.50*** 
(0.04) 
0.74*** 
(0.02) 
Confidence to find another job 1.005** (0.00) 
1.002 
(0.00) 
1.000 
(0.00) 
1.004*** 
(0.00) 
Probability to leave job voluntary 1.001 (0.00) 
1.002 
(0.00) 
1.000 
(0.00) 
0.999 
(0.00) 
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Extrinsic search motivation:     
Fixed term contract reference reference reference reference 
Casual contract 0.93 (0.20) 
0.92 
(0.21) 
0.99 
(0.22) 
0.84 
(0.17) 
Permanent contract 1.19 (0.18) 
0.87 
(0.19) 
1.07 
(0.19) 
1.04 
(0.15) 
Fear to lose the previous job 0.996* (0.00) 
0.997 
(0.00) 
0.995* 
(0.00) 
0.998 
(0.00) 
Forced to leave previous job 0.91 (0.14) 
0.90 
(0.15) 
0.67** 
(0.16) 
0.67*** 
(0.12) 
Job characteristics (previous job):     
Tenure 1.03*** (0.01) 
1.001 
(0.01) 
1.01 
(0.01) 
1.02** 
(0.01) 
Was looking for a new job 0.80* (0.13) 
0.995 
(0.13) 
0.91 
(0.13) 
1.01 
(0.10) 
Educational level:     
(Pre-)primary/secondary school reference reference reference reference 
Certificate 1.03 (0.14) 
0.89 
(0.14) 
0.93 
(0.14) 
0.94 
(0.11) 
Advanced diploma and diploma 0.83 (0.21) 
1.21 
(0.21) 
0.84 
(0.21) 
0.85 
(0.17) 
(Post) Graduate, bachelor degree 1.19 (0.16) 
0.89 
(0.17) 
0.76 
(0.18) 
0.96 
(0.14) 
Rest 0.43 (0.60) 
1.01 
(0.55) 
0.27** 
(0.62) 
0.58 
(0.40) 
Industry level (last job):     
Private sector reference reference reference reference 
Public sector 1.06 (0.15) 
1.17 
(0.15) 
0.97 
(0.16) 
1.13 
(0.11) 
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Occupational level (last job):     
Labourers reference reference reference reference 
Elementary workers 1.15 (0.23) 
1.03 
(0.23) 
1.01 
(0.23) 
0.90 
(0.19) 
Intermediate production workers 1.59 (0.26) 
0.90 
(0.27) 
0.98 
(0.27) 
1.02 
(0.21) 
Intermediate clerical workers 1.02 (0.21) 
1.03 
(0.21) 
0.83 
(0.22) 
0.84 
(0.18) 
Advanced clericals 1.52 (0.35) 
1.11 
(0.35) 
1.15 
(0.37) 
1.28 
(0.30) 
Tradespersons 1.25 (0.24) 
1.43 
(0.24) 
0.91 
(0.25) 
1.04 
(0.19) 
Associate professionals 1.10 (0.23) 
0.82 
(0.24) 
1.05 
(0.24) 
0.83 
(0.20) 
Managers, professionals 1.03 (0.23) 
0.77 
(0.23) 
0.88 
(0.24) 
0.84 
(0.19) 
Year:     
2001 reference reference reference reference 
2002 1.17 (0.06) 
1.12 
(0.11) 
1.16 
(0.11) 
1.12 
(0.08) 
     
No of observations 2,192 2,200 2,198 2,190 
No where dependent variable is 1 991 934 889  
* 10% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance. Standard errors in parentheses 
Finally, the last regression in Table 4 (overall improvement) is based on a dependent 
variable constructed to take all three quality measures into account. We do this to find 
confirmation that a quality improvement in one aspect of the job is not at the expense of 
another. Since hours worked and job security did not influence the change in pay 
satisfaction once a new job was found (and vice versa), we had an indication that a 
quality improvement in one aspect of the job will not be at the expense of another. The 
results confirm this. Five out of six variables related to intrinsically motivated job search 
indicate that intrinsic job search leads to a better job. Extrinsic search on the other hand 
does not lead to a higher quality job and in the case of forced reasons for job loss to a 
significantly lower quality job. Subsequently, we also find support for the second part of 
hypothesis 1 and 2. 
4.3 Locating intrinsic and extrinsic job search 
The notion of intrinsic and extrinsic motivated job search fits nicely into DLM theory. As 
outlined in Section 3 the DLM approach predicts job quality improvements to occur in 
the PLM segment only. In terms of intrinsic and extrinsic motivated job search, we 
expect intrinsic search to be found in the primary segment, whereas extrinsic search 
should be a typical feature of the SLM. 
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Though a clear division of the PLM and SLM along the lines of educational, sector and 
occupational levels is not yet available, we expect to find more highly educated 
employees in the higher occupational jobs in the primary sector. Therefore, we run two 
least squares regressions using an intrinsic job search variable (confidence to find an 
Table 5 Locating intrinsic and extrinsic search, 2001-2003 
 Dependent variables 
Independent variables Confidence to find an 
equal or better job 
Fear to lose the job 
Constant 61.64*** 
(1.31) 
16.05*** 
(0.89) 
Personal characteristics:   
Age cohort:    
16−30 years reference reference 
31−40 years −3.89*** 
(0.73) 
0.54 
(0.50) 
41−50 years −6.30*** 
(0.76) 
1.91*** 
(0.52) 
51−65 years −14.59*** 
(0.88) 
3.15*** 
(0.59) 
Female reference reference 
Male −2.82*** 
(0.60) 
1.04** 
(0.41) 
Living outside capital cities reference reference 
Sydney 4.85*** 
(0.78) 
1.89*** 
(0.53) 
Melbourne 4.40*** 
(0.74) 
1.61*** 
(0.50) 
Brisbane 4.24*** 
(0.93) 
0.54 
(0.63) 
Adelaide 8.29*** 
(1.09) 
−0.05 
(0.75) 
Perth 5.31*** 
(1.07) 
−0.58 
(0.72) 
Type of contract:   
Tenure −0.77*** 
(0.04) 
−0.34*** 
(0.03) 
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Educational level:   
(Pre-)primary/secondary school reference reference 
Certificate 1.78** 
(0.69) 
0.87* 
(0.47) 
Advanced diploma and diploma 4.12*** 
(1.11) 
−0.36 
(0.76) 
(Post) Graduate, bachelor degree 7.79*** 
(0.86) 
0.84 
(0.58) 
Rest 2.18 
(2.49) 
0.16 
(1.70) 
Industry level:   
Manufacturing reference reference 
Agriculture 5.65*** 
(1.92) 
1.33 
(1.31) 
Mining −5.51** 
(2.18) 
2.86* 
(1.48) 
Electricity, water, gas −9.82*** 
(2.82) 
2.20 
(1.89) 
Construction 9.03*** 
(1.48) 
0.56 
(1.01) 
Wholesale 3.43** 
(1.54) 
−0.01 
(1.05) 
Retail / Restaurants 10.23*** 
(1.07) 
−4.18*** 
(0.73) 
Transport 4.10*** 
(1.56) 
−2.96*** 
(1.06) 
Finance / property business 4.55*** 
(1.08) 
0.43 
(0.73) 
Government 4.30*** 
(1.01) 
−4.65*** 
(0.69) 
Cultural services 2.09 
(1.31) 
−3.98*** 
(0.89) 
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Occupational level:   
Managers, professionals 5.08*** 
(0.90) 
−1.58*** 
(0.61) 
Associate professionals 0.36 
(0.99) 
−1.53** 
(0.67) 
Tradespersons 4.38*** 
(1.13) 
−0.77 
(0.77) 
Advanced clericals 5.40*** 
(1.61) 
−3.56*** 
(1.08) 
Intermediate clerical workers reference reference 
Intermediate production workers 0.31 
(1.20) 
0.81 
(0.82) 
Elementary workers −0.92 
(1.10) 
−0.46 
(0.75) 
Labourers −2.51*** 
(1.16) 
2.50*** 
(0.78) 
   
Year:   
2001 reference reference 
2002 −0.11 
(0.64) 
−3.32*** 
(0.43) 
2003 −0.22 
(0.64) 
−3.67*** 
(0.43) 
   
No of observations 15,648 15,908 
10% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance. Standard errors in parentheses. 
equal or better paying job) and an extrinsic job search variable (fear to lose the job) as 
dependent variables, respectively, in an attempt to locate both types of search. The results 
are summarised in Table 5. 
The first regression shows that intrinsic search indeed takes place in the PLM segment, 
consistent with DLM theory. More highly educated employees are more confident of 
finding another job. Given the analyses in Sections 2 and 3 we expect these employees 
also to succeed in finding higher quality jobs. 
The contrary holds for employees searching extrinsically. The final column in Table 5 
suggests that extrinsic search is a phenomenon that occurs predominantly in lower 
occupational level jobs. Given our earlier finding that extrinsic job search is less likely to 
lead to job quality improvements than intrinsic job search; this is in line with DLM 
theory. 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper has considered DLM theory from a new angle by concentrating on search 
behaviour. Our hypothesis is that such behaviour should be different across the PLM and 
the SLM. We employed HILDA survey data from 2001-2003 to test our job search 
behaviour hypothesis. Important elements of the behaviour are intrinsic motivation to 
search for a new job, which presumably dominates on the PLM, and extrinsic motivation, 
which presumably dominates in the SLM. 
With respect to employed job search, we find that both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
is linked positively to job search. However, the former leads to a more successful search 
process, whereas the latter does not. Moreover, we find that intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation affects unemployed job search in a similar way. This suggests that 
pressurising the unemployed (i.e. extrinsic motivation) is not an effective mechanism to 
lead the unemployed back into employment. 
We also explore the effect of intrinsic and extrinsic search on the quality of the new job 
of the employed job searcher relative to the quality of the job she leaves. We find that 
intrinsic search leads to a better job. Extrinsic search on the other hand does not lead to a 
higher quality job and in the case of forced reasons for job loss to a significantly lower 
quality job. 
Finally we try to identify the incidence of intrinsic and extrinsic job search of employed 
workers. We expect intrinsic search to be found in the primary segment and extrinsic 
search to be a typical feature of the secondary market. Our results yield occupational and 
educational levels patterns of intrinsic and extrinsic search which are consistent with 
DLM theory. 
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Appendix: 
Table I Descriptive statistics (shares, unless mentioned otherwise), HILDA 2001-2003 
employees unemployed     respondents  
variables 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 
Age cohort:  16-30 years 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.37 0.39 0.31 
  31-40 years 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.19 0.21 0.24 
  41-50 years 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.21 0.21 0.20 
  51-65 years 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.25 
Male 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.45 0.42 
Residence: Living outside major stat. region 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.44 0.44 
  Sydney 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.19 
  Melbourne 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 
  Brisbane 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 
  Adelaide 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 
  Perth 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Hours worked: Full time 0.71 0.70 0.70    
  Voluntary part-time 0.03 0.03 0.04    
  Involuntary part-time 0.26 0.27 0.27    
Type of contract: Fixed term contract 0.09 0.10 0.09    
  Casual contract 0.23 0.24 0.22    
  Permanent contract 0.68 0.66 0.69    
Education:  (Pre-)primary/secondary school 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.51 0.53 0.52 
  Certificate 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.29 0.28 0.28 
  Advanced diploma and diploma 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.05 
  (Post) Graduate, bachelor degree 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.12 0.13 0.13 
  Rest (unknown) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Public sector 0.36 0.36 0.28 0.21 0.26 0.24 
Occupation: Managers, professionals 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.12 0.11 0.15 
  Associate professionals 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.05 
  Tradespersons 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.09 
  Advanced clericals 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 
  Intermediate clerical workers 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 
  Intermediate production workers 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.04 
  Elementary workers 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.18 
  Labourers 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.22 0.29 0.32 
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Reason job loss:  Ran out of contract    0.16 0.21 0.14 
  Employer initiated break-up    0.31 0.32 0.22 
  Employee initiated break-up    0.12 0.18 0.28 
  Self employed    0.02 0.02 0.06 
  Health or personal reasons    0.40 0.27 0.30 
Search channels: Centre link    0.58 0.50 0.52 
  Advertisements    0.48 0.38 0.35 
  Employment agency (private)    0.41 0.35 0.25 
  Informal search    0.66 0.62 0.56 
       
Looking for a job in last four weeks 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.86 0.79 0.74 
Job changers 0.40 0.42  0.47 0.49  
Forced reasons to leave the previous job 0.19 0.17 0.18    
Share of long-term unemployment in total unempl.    0.51 0.52 0.54 
       
Tenure in years (mean) 7.09 6.80 6.97    
Pay satisfaction: scale 0-10 (mean) 6.68 6.71 6.81    
Hours worked satisfaction: scale 0-10 (mean) 7.13 7.10 7.11    
Job security satisfaction: scale 0-10 (mean) 7.66 7.82 7.92    
Confidence to find another job: scale 0-100 (mean) 62.89 63.00 62.44    
Fear to lose the current job: scale 0-100 (mean) 13.73 10.47 10.12    
Prob. to leave the job voluntarily: scale 0-100 (mean) 21.96 22.06 21.79    
       
Respondents (numbers) 6,425 6,559 6,558 539 576 493 
 
                                                 
1 The authors are Professor of Economics and Director of Centre of Full Employment and Equity at the 
University of Newcastle, Australia (Mitchell); Professor of Economics and Director of CofFEE-Europe at 
the University of Maastricht, The Netherlands; and Postdoctoral Fellow, Centre of Full Employment and 
Equity at the University of Newcastle, Australia (Welters). 
2 In Tables 3 and 4 we present odds ratios in stead of logit coefficients. The odds ratio is defined as the ratio 
of the odds of an event occurring in one group to the odds of it occurring in the control group. The odds 
ratio can be computed taking the natural exponent of coefficients of a logit regression. 
3 Since we control for the fear to lose the job in all regressions, those looking for more job security do not 
do so because they fear unemployment, but look for more stability in their career, which is an intrinsic, not 
an extrinsic, motive. 
4 Since discouraged unemployed (unemployed that do not search for work) hardly face pressure from 
Centrelink to find a job, we cannot include the ‘Centrelink pressure’ variable in the job search regression of 
unemployed. 
